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A person illegally arrested, even though he has acquiesced in the
arrest, may use such force as is necessary to regain his liberty, and if
there is reasonable ground to believe that the officer intends to shoot to
prevent his escape, may shoot the officer in self-defense.
WHEN THE KILLING OF AN

OFFICER WHO

IS

MAKING AN

ILLEGAL ARREST IS JUSTIFIABLE.

The general principle is that where the deceased had theauthority to make the arrest and was resisted and killed while
in the proper exercise of such authority, the killing will be
murder, but where the arrest was illegal, and the killing was
done in the passion caused by such illegal taking into custody,
the offence is reduced to manslaughter: Foster, 270, Hale's
F. C. 465, and Raffer y v. People, 69 Ill. 115 (873).
Where the process was regular the defendant should have
submitted, and the law will not excuse him for taking life, but
where an officer attempts to put an illegal restraint upon the
defendant, even if "attempted in a manner free from violence
" or the exercise of harsh measures in effecting it," the law
considers such circumstance, though it fall short of a justification, as establishing such a provocation as may, on account of
the excitement odcasioned thereby, so far excuse the act as to
reduce the crime to manslaughter: R. v. Patience,7 C. & P.
775 (1837); R. v. Chapman, 12 Cox C. C. 4 (187r), and
Brig'gs v. Com., 82 Va. 554 (1886).

1Reported

in 29 S. IV. Rep. ro74.
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In this class of cases it will be seen, by reading the
authorities, that the person arrested or attempted to be
arrested, made use of more force than was necessary to obtain
his liberty and that the killing of the officer was not at all
requisite to the attainment of the object desired.
In the principal case, however, the deceased, who was a
constable, was killed by the defendant while the latter was
attempting to escape from an illegal arrest and at a time when
he believed that he would be shot by the deceased, who was
pointing a loaded gun at him, if he did not fire first.
The decision seems to be in consonance with the authorities, which are not numerous, and with sound reason. The
deceased had made an arrest which he had not the least
authority to do and, having taken the prisoner into custody,
was endeavoring to prevent the latter from exercising that
right of liberty which is inherent in all men and which cannot
be abridged except by due process of law. This attempt of
the officer was backed up by a deadly weapon and was
resisted in a like manner with the result as noted above. In
other words, the defendant merely presented "force to force."
The judge of the court below in his charge to the jury had
said, "But if a person submit to arrest and acquiesces in the
"authority of the officer to make the arrest, he waives every
"objection or right he may have made to any irregularity or
"illegality in the same on the arrest; and if thereafter he
"breaks away from the officer he acts unlawfully and, in a
"conflict between him and the officer consequent thereon, he,
"in law, would be the aggressor."
This charge was held by the Court of Appeals to be not
only "Not law, but an outrage upon law. A citizen is illegally
"arrested without resistance. He attempts to regain his
"liberty by flight. He is the aggressor if he should shoot
"the trespasser to save his own life-shoot and kill the very
"man who was and had been in the very act of killing him,
"because he was attempting to release himself from the, in
"law, real aggressor."
Continuing the court said that "Being wrongfully and
"illegally deprived of his liberty, appellant had the same right
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"to regain it, and right to use the same means, force or
-"resistance, as he had in preventing an illegal arrest. Being
"'falsely imprisoned he had the right to his liberty, and, for the
"purpose of obtaining it, could use all force necessary for that
"purpose, taking care to use no more than was required.
"What degree of violence is necessary always depends upon
"'that used or attempted by his adversary. To illustrate:
"A. is illegally arrested, and attempts to regain his liberty.
"His adversary proposes to prevent this by the use of deadly
"weapons. A. may resort to such weapons. A. flees from
"such arrest. The officer presents in a shooting position, his
" gun, demanding him to halt. A. can shoot if it reasonably
"'appears to him that the officer will shoot."
This is in accordance with the law as laid down by the court
in Aford v. State, 8 Tex. Ap. 566 (188o), where it was said
that the right of resistance is not limited to the actual caption,
but continues to the cessation of the unlawful detention, and
the party detained or some other person in his behalf can,
under such circumstances, "use all the force adequate to resist
tHe aggression and effect the liberation, even to the extent of
taking life, if that be essential; and a homicide perpetrated for
that purpose alone cannot be regarded as culpable."
In Wharton on Homicide, § 227, it is said, that if A.
unlawfully attempts to arrest B., the latter is justified in resisting, and if he is so pressed by A. as to make it necessary to
.choose between submission and killing A., then the killing is
not even manslaughter. So, if A.'s assault has mixed in it a
felonious intent, then B., if necessary to avert the danger, may
take A.'s life.
And in C'reigiton v. Cbm., 83 Ky. 142 (1885), and State v.
Underwood, 75 M o. 230 (1881), we find it stated that a person
who is being illegally arrested has a right to take the life of
the person so attempting, if it is necessary to save his own
life or his person from great bodily harm.
In other words, if the arrest be without lawful authority and
-the resistance is only such as is provoked by, and in due proportion to the assault, and the killing is not malicious, it would
not be criminal: State v. No/es, 26 Ala. 31 (1855); State v.
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Oliver, 2 Houston, 604 (1863), and State v. Scheele, 57 Conn..
307 (1889).
We will now review a few of the authorities which seem to,
support the decision in the principal case.
In Ross v. State, io Tex. Ap. 455 (1881), the deceased, who
was a town marshal, endeavored illegally to take a gun from
the defendant under the pretense that it was contrary to law to
carry one, and, when prevented from doing so, fired a shot.
Defendant then shot at"deceased and killed him.
HART, J., in delivering the opinion of the court, said, "The.
"citizen has the right to maintain his liberty at all hazards,
"against any and all persons who attempt to invade it unlaw"fully, taking care not rashly to use or resort to greater
"violence than is necessary to its protection. Again, being
"in the right, he is permitted to anticipate the aggressor and
"prepare himself by drawing a weapon, or making any other
"preparations, and if his life is imperiled or he is in danger of
"serious bodily harm, to use every means in the defence of'
"his person or liberty. He is not required to permit his
"assailant to take the lead, and thereby give him the advan"tage, but, if the surroundings indicate a resort to a serious or
"deadly conflict on the part of the adversary, he can prepare
"to meet it, and if the adversary makes demonstration upon
"his life or liberty, or shows an intent to inflict serious bodily
"harm upon him, he can kill him and be held blameless by"the law of the land."
In Jones v. State, 26 Tex. Ap. I (1888), the deceased, whowas a deputy sheriff of Llano county, went into San Saba county
to serve a warrant on the defendant. Defendant was in bed,
and deceased called to him and said he had a paper for him.
Defendant came down stairs in a few minutes and deceased
said, "shall I read the paper, or shall you read it." Defendant said he would read it. Upon reading it he said to.
deceased that he would not go with him, wben deceased said
"You won't?" and threw up his pistol and fired. Defendant
immediately fired at deceased and killed him. The shots werealmost simultaneous.
Held, that the sheriff had no right to serve a warrant out-
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side his county, and that, the attempted arrest was therefore
illegal.
The court said that as deceased had made an unlawful
attack upon the defendant, reasonably calculated to create in
a man of ordinary mind a belief that deceased was about to
inflict on him death or serious bodily injury, the right of
defendant to kill in such case was complete.
In A lford v. State, supra, a warrant was made out in the
name of John Smith, and then defendant's name illegally
inserted by an officer, who was killed while attempting to
arrest the defendant.
The court said that an unlawful arrest is a continuous
assault, of an aggravated character, and the right of resistance
thereto is not limited to the time at which it is attempted or
accomplished, but continues throughout the unlawful detention
and may be exercised not only by the person detained, but
by another in his behalf, and with the force requisite to effect
the, release of the person so detained.
A homicide which
results from the use of such force is not culpable.
In Tiner v. State, 44 Tex. 128 (1875), the defendant, who
was guilty of a misdemeanor, was ordered to halt while riding
th:-ough the streets of a city at night by two men, whom he
did not know to be policemen. He refused to do so, and on
seeking to avoid them was fired at. He returned the fire-and
killed one of them.
The court held that as the oicer had shot at him while
attempting to make an illegal arrest, and when no resistance
had been offered, and when the life of the officer was not in
danger, that the defendant could protect himself in the same
manner as he could against an ordinary citizen under like
circumstances, and that if he killed the officer in the defence
of his life he was not culpable.
In Dyson v. State, 14 Tex. Ap. 454 (1883), A. and B., his
brother, were peaceably walking together when C. rushed up
with a drawn pistol, and, with oaths and violence, attempted
illegally to arrest A. He resisted and during the scuffle C.'s
pistol was discharged, and B. then drew his revolver and
killed C.
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Held, that if it reasonably appeared to B. that it was necessary to kill C. in order to liberate A. the homicide was justifiable.
To sum the whole matter up, if the person illegally
restrained of his liberty uses no more force than is necessary
to obtain his freedom, and only shoots as-a last resort, he will
not be held accountable before the law.
C. PERCY WILLCOX.
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(This case, reportedin NortheasternReporter, Vol. 4 o, page 2o6, was
recently decided by the Court oJ Appeals of New York. The question
involved is one of such importance to the business community and one
which has been regarded as doubtful for so long, that we print the
decisicn in full, the facts appearing sufficiently in the learnedjudge's
opinion.).

Appeal from Supreme Court, General Term, First Department.
Action by the American Sugar Refining Company against
Charles H. Fancher, assignee. From a judgment of the
General Term (30 N. Y. Supp. 482), reversing a judgment
for plaintiff, plaintiff appeals. Reversed.
Charles E. Hughes, for appellant.
respondent.

James B. Dill, for

ANDREWS, C. J.-This case presents a question of considerable practical importance.

It relates to the equitable juris-

diction of the court, under special circumstances, to follow
proceeds of personal property in the hands of a fraudulent
vendee or his general assignee for the benefit of creditors at
the suit of a defrauded vendor, who by false pretenses was
induced to part with the property upon credit, the proceeds
sought to be reached being the sums due from subvendees
of the fraudulent purchaser arising on resales by him made
before the discovery by the plaintiff of the fraud. The facts
upon which the question arises are substantially conceded and
are free from complication. Between the 2oth day of September, 1892, and the 2oth day of October following, the
plaintiff sold and delivered to the mercantile firm of C. Burkhalter & Co., doing business in the city of New York, sugars
of various qualities on credit for the price in the aggregate
of $19,121.4, no part of which has been paid, the last sale
401
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having been made October 19, 1892. On the next day the
firm, being insolvent and owing debts greatly in excess of its
assets, made a general assignment to the defendant for the
benefit of its creditors. Among the assighed assets were a
portion of the sugars sold by the plaintiff to the firm, which
he replevied from the assignee; but the firm, prior to the
assignment, had sold to numerous persons, customers of the
firm, in the ordinary course of trade, portions of the sugars
on credit, and claims held by the firm against the subvendees
arising out of such sales, exceeding in the aggregate the sum

of $io,ooo, were among the assets which passed by the
assignment. These claims were collected by the assignee
after the assignment, and (excepting a small sum) after notice
had been served by the plaintiff on the assignee that it
rescinded the original sale for fraud, which notice was accompanied by a demand for the sugars then in the possession of
the assignee, and for an accounting and the delivery to the
plaintiff of the outstanding claims against the customers of
Burkhalter & Co. in their hands for the sugars sold by the
firm as above stated. The assignee declined to accede to the
demand made. On the trial the parties by stipulation fixed
the amount of the claims for sugars sold which had come to
the hands of the assignee, and which had been collected by
him. The fraud of Burkhalter & Co. was not controverted.
It was shown that the sales were induced by a gross misrepresentation in writing made by one of the members of the
firm to the plaintiff as to the solvency of the firm, made on or
about September 20, 1892, within 3o days before the assignment, and when the firm was owing several hundred thousand
dollars more than the value of its whole assets.
The case presented is singularly free from any uncertainty
in respect to the facts upon which the equitable jurisdiction to
follow the proceeds of the sugars is claimed.
They are
definite and ascertained, but it is insisted that the court is
impotent to give relief by way of subjecting the choses in
action or their proceeds, representing the sugars, to a lien in
favor of the defrauded vendor, or to adjudge that they shall
be applied in partial recompense and restitution for the
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-property so wrongfully obtained, because, as is claimed, such
relief -'s not in any such case within the scope of the powers
*of courts of equity as heretofore defined and exercised, and
for the further reason that new rights have intervened by
reason of the assignment. The fraud of Burkhalter & Co.
was, as we have said, admitted. They are hopelessly insolvent, and were so at the time they took plaintiff's goods.
They disposed of a large part of the sugars before the plaintiff became cognizant of the fraud. The plaintiff was only
,apprised of it after the assignment was made. The remedy
at law upon the contract against the fraudulent and insolvent
-purchaser is, under the circumstances, ineffectual.
The
pursuit of the property, except the small part of it which
was unsold and passed to the assignee, is impracticable. If
it could yet be found unconsumed and capable of identification, the multiplicity of suits which would be rendered neces•sary to reclaim it would make the remedy expensive, burden.somie and inadequate. The identification of the proceeds
sought to be reached is complete and unquestioned.
It is
not claimed that the credits or the money into which they
have been converted are not the very proceeds of sugars of
which the plaintiff was defrauded.
The jurisdiction of a court of equity to follow the proceeds
,ofproperty taken from the true owner by felony, or misapplied
by an agent or trustee, and converted into property of another
description, and to permit the true owner to take the property
in its altered state as his own, or to hold it as security for the
value of the property wrongfully taken or misapplied, or, in
-case the original property or its proceeds have been mingled
with that of the wrongdoers in the purchase of other property,
to have a charge declared in favor of the person injured to
the extent necessary for his indemnity, so long as the rights
of bonafide purchasers do not intervene, has been frequently
exerted, and is a jurisdiction founded upon the plainest principles of reason and justice. The case of XVwton v. Portc;-,
69 N. Y. 133, is an illustration of the application of this
principle in a case of the larceny of negotiable bonds, sold
by the thieves, in which the court subjected securities in
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which they invested the money, and which they had transferred with notice to third persons as security for services to
he rendered, to a charge in favor of the owner of the stolen
bonds. The cases upon this head are very numerous, where
there nas been a misapplication of trust funds by trustees, or
persons standing in a fiduciary relation, and the money or
property misapplied has been laid out in land or converted
into other species of property. The court in such cases lays
hold of the substituted property and follows the original fund,
through all the changes it has undergone, until the power of
identification is lost or the rights of bonafide purchasers stop
the pursuit, and holds it in its grasp to indemnify the innocent
victim of the fraud. And even in case of money, which is
said to have no earmark, its identity will not be deemed lost,
though it is mingled with other money of the wrongdoer, if
it can be shown that it forms a part of the general mass:
Pennell v. Deffell, 4 De Gex, M. & G. 372; In re Hallett's
Estate, 13 Ch. Div. 696; Holmes v. Gilmau, 138 N. Y. 369,
34 N. E. 205. In the cases of stolen property, or of misapplication by a trustee or agent of the funds of the principal
or cestui que trust, the title of the real owner of the property
has been in most cases lost, without his consent, and the
court, by a species of equitable substitution, repairs, as far as
practicable, the wrong, and prevents the wrongdoer from
profiting by his fraud.
And, indeed, courts of law, borrowing the equitable principle,
in cases of misappropriation by agents, vest in the principal at
his election the legal title to a chattel or security in the hands
of the agent, purchased exclusively by the application of the
embezzled or misappropriated fund: Taylor.v. Plumer, 3 Maule
& S. 562. It is at this point that the controversy in the
present case commences, and the divergence arises which has
led to this litigation. It is claimed, on behalf of the defendant,
that courts of equity in commercial cases, where the claim of
the plaintiff originates in a fraud in the sale of personal property, do not undertake to follow proceeds in the hands of the
wrongdoer, but that the defrauded party, having consented to
part with his title, is remitted exclusively to such legal reme-

AMERICAN SUGAR REFINERY CO. V.

FANCHER.

,dies as are given for the redress of the wrong.
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tion of courts of equity in cases of trust or agency, or cases
of like character, it is insisted, is founded upon the ancient
jurisdiction of these courts over trusts and fiduciary relations,
-and has not been and ought not to be extended beyond these
cases. It is very true that trusts and trust relations are peculiarly cognizable in equity, and have been so cognizable from
the earliest period of equitable jurisprudence. But it is to be
said that these are but branches of the larger jurisdiction over
frauds, which equity abhors, and of which it has cognizance
admittedly in many cases not connected with technical trusts
or agency. It cannot be denied that the protection of cestuis
que trustet against frauds of the trustee is an object of peculiar
solicitude in the courts of equity. They, in many cases, are
incapable, by reason of age, inexperience, or other incapacity,
from looking out for themselves, and the court stands in the
attitude of guardian of their interests. But, as has been said,
a court of equity does not restrict its remedial processes to the
aid of the helpless or the ignorant. It embraces within its
view the general claims included within what are called quasi
trugts, and intervenes to prevent violations of equitable duty
by whomsoever committed or whoever may suffer from the
violation. It goes altogether outside of trust relations in
many cases to prevent fraud, or to compel a restoration of
pr6perty obtained by fraud. The exercise of the jurisdiction
to set aside fraudulent transfers of real or personal property
made in fraud of creditors is familiar. And the jurisdiction is
most beneficially invoked in cases of private fraud to rescind
transfers of real estate procured by fraudulent representations,
and to restore to the defrauded vendor the title of which he
has been defrauded. It often happens in cases of transfers of
real estate procured by fraud that, before the action is brought
or the plaintiff is apprised of the fraud, the fraudulent vendee
has disposed of the land in whole or in part, or has created
liens thereon in favor of the bona fide purchasers for value.
In such cases the court will mold the relief to suit the circumstances, and will, at the election of the plaintiff, rescind the
contract and compel a reconveyance of the part of the land
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still remaining in the hands of the vendor, and compel the
wrongdoer to account for the proceeds of the land sold, or
award compensation in damages. The court in many cases
resorts to the fiction of a trust, and, by construction, adjudges
that the proceeds in the hands of the wrongdoer are held by
him as trustee of the plaintiff. This was the exact nature of
the relief granted in the case of Trevelyan v. White, I Beav.
589, as appears by the recital of the decree in the opinion of'
the master of the rolls, where part of the estate had been sold
by the fraudulent vendee. In Chzeney v. Gleason, I 17 Mass.
557, a bill was filed by the defrauded vendor of real estate to
reach a mortgage taken by the vendee on the land on a resale
by him, and the court sustained the bill and granted the
relief. In Hammond v. Pennock, 61 N. Y. 145, the court
rescinded, at the instance of the plaintiff, a contract for theexchange of real and personal property, owned by the plaintiff, for a farm of the defendant in Michigan, which had been
consummated on the plaintiff's part by a conveyance and
transfer, the contract and conveyance having been obtained by
the defendant by fraudulent representations; and the defendant having, after the conveyance to him, contracted tc sell
part of the land conveyed to him by the plaintiff, the courtadapted the relief to the circumstances, and rescinded the
conveyance so far as practicable, and adjudged that the.
defendant account for the proceeds of the personal property
included in the sale.
If the jurisdiction exercised by courts of equity in respect
to undoing fraudulent conveyances of real estate, and following the proceeds in the hands of the fraudulent grantee,.
appertains in like manner and degree to sales of personalty,
it would seem that the plaintiff in the prnsent case was entitled
to relief. The fact that, before the action was brought, Burkhalter & Co. had made a general assignment for the benefit of
creditors to the defendant is no obstacle to the relief, if, except
for the assignment, the court would have interposed, on the
prayer of the plaintiff, its preventive and other remedies, to
have enabled the plaintiff to reach the unpaid claims against
the subvendees. An assignee for creditors is not a purchaser-
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for value, and stands in no other or better position than his
assignor as respects a remedy to reach the proceeds of the
sales by Burkhalter & Co.: Goodwin v. Wertheimer, 99 N. Y.
149, i N. E. 404; Barnard v. Caipbell, 58 N. Y. 7 ; Ratcliffe v. Saigton, IS Md. 383 ; Bussing v. Rice, 2 Cush. 48.
It is claimed that the general creditors of the firm will be
prejudiced if the plaintiff is allowed to prevail, and that he
will thereby acquire a preference over the other creditors of
the insolvent firm. But general creditors have no equity or
right to have appropriated to the payment of their debts the
property of the plaintiff, or property to which it is equitably
entitled as between it and Burkhalter & Co.
They, so far as appears, advanced nothing, and gave no
credit on the faith of the firm's possession of the sugars,
assuming that that element would have had any bearing on
the case. If the sugars had existed in specie in the hands of
the assignee, it cannot be doubted that the plaintiff on rescinding the sale would have been entitled to retake them, and the
general creditors are in no worse position, if the plaintiff is
awarded the proceeds, than they 'would have been if the
sugars had remained unsold. Much was said on the argument upon the difference between a trespasser taking and
disposing of the property of another and the case of a sale of
personal property to a vendee induced by fraud. It is the law
of'this state, as in England, that title passes on such a sale to
the fraudulent vendee, notwithstanding that the crime of false
pretenses is included in the statute definition of a felony, but
ell,
which was not such at common law: Barnardv. Ca
supra; Wise v. Grant, 14o N. Y. 593, 35 N. E. 1078; Benj.
Sales (6th Ed.) § 433 ; Fasset v. Smith, 23 N. Y. 252 ; Benedict v. Willial's, 48 Hun, 124. But a purchase procured by
fraud is in no sense, as between the vendor and vendee, rightful. It was wrongful, and, while a transfer so induced vests
a right of property in the vendee until the sale is rescinded,
the means and act by which it was procured was a violation
of an elemental principle of justice. But the rule is that a
sale of personal property induced by fraud is not void, but is
only voidable on the part .of the party defrauded. "This
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does not mean that the contract is void until ratified; it
means that the contract is valid until rescinded." When a
contract of sale is infected by fraud of the vendee is consummated, and the property delivered, the vendor on discovering
the fraud may pursue one of several courses. He may affirm
the contract, and an omission to disaffirm within a reasonable
time after notice of the fraud will be deemed a ratification.
He may elect to rescind it, and thereby his title to the property is reinstated as against the purchaser and all persons
deriving title from him, not being bona fide purchasers for
value, and a purchaser is not such who takes the property
for an antecedent debt, or who purchased the property on
credit, and has not paid the purchase money or been placed
in a position where payment to a transferee of the claim cannot be resisted: Barnardv. Campbell, supra; Dews v. Kidder,
84 N.Y. 121; Afatson v. Melcltor, 42 Mich. 477, 4 N.W. 200;
i Benj. Sales, p. 57o, note.
Upon rescission the vendor may follow and retake the
property wherever he can find it, except in the case mentioned,
or he may sue for conversion. When these legal remedies
are available and adequate, clearly there is no ground for
going to a court of equity. The legal remedies in such case
.are and ought to be held exclusive. But in a case like the
present, where there is no adequate legal remedy, either on
the contract of sale or for the recovery of the property in
specie, or by an action of tort, is the power of a court of
equity so fettered that where it is shown that the property has
been converted by the vendee, and the proceeds, in the form
of notes or credits, are identified beyond question in his hands,
or in possession of his voluntary assignee, it cannot impound
such proceeds for the benefit of the defrauded vendor? The
only reason urged in denial of this power which to our minds
has any force is based on the assumption that it would be
contrary to public policy to admit such an equitable principle
into commercial transactions. But with the two limitations
adverted to, and which ought strictly to be observed, (I) that
it must appear that the plaintiff has no adequate remedy at
law, either in consequence of insolvency, the dispersion of the
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property, or other cause, and (2) that nothing will be adjudged
as proceeds except what can be specifically identified as such,
business interests will have adequate protection. Indeed, the
disturbance would be much less than is now permitted in
following the property from hand to hand until a bona fidepurchaser is found.
The case of Sinall v. Attwood, Younge, 507, is a very
instructive case, which involved a large amount, was argued*
by eminent counsel, and received great consideration.. It
supports, we think, the equitable jurisdiction invoked in thepresent case. It was an action by the purchaser to rescind'
a contract for the sale of mines and mining property induced
by fraudulent representations, and to recover the purchasemoney paid to the amount of about C2oo,ooo. The court
found the fraud and rescinded the contract, and made a decree
for an accounting. On a supplemental bill being filed, show-,
ing that the purchase money paid had been invested by the
seller in public securities in his name, which he afterwards
caused to be put in the name of his mother, and that the
pdrchaser had no other means adequate to repay the purchase
mbney, the chancellor, on an application for an injunction
restraining the transfer of the securities, held that the money
paid could be followed into the stock purchased, and granted
the injunction. The case of Cavin v. Gleason, io 5 N.Y. 256,
i:r N. E. 504, was an attempt to fasten upon the estate of an
insolvent a preferential lien for money put into his hands by
the plaintiff for the purchase of a mortgage for her, and which,
he applied, without authority, to the payment of his debts.
before the assignment, with the exception of a small sum
($3o), which went into the hands of the assignee. The court
held that the money, which the insolvent had used to pay
debts prior to the assignment, was not a preferred debt, but
sustained her right to be paid the small sum which the
assignee received belonging to the trust. This case points
the distinction. The character of the debt gave it no priority.
The fund had been dissipated, and could not be traced among
the assigned assets. There was no equitable ground of preference except for the small sum mentioned.
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Upon the whole case, we are of the opinion that the judgment on the report of the referee was correct, and the order
granting a new trial should therefore be reversed, and the
judgment on the report of the referee affirmed, with costs.
Judgment accordingly. All concur.

